The Good & Bad of the I-35 Collapse Response

     A federal report on last year's collapse of Minneapolis' Interstate-35 Mississippi River bridge finds lots to like about the way the region's public safety forces responded, but also chronicles some missteps that could have led to trouble.

     The report, I-35W Bridge Collapse and Response, is part of the U.S. Fire Administration's regular examination of fires and other disasters in an effort to distill and disseminate lessons that can benefit other responders in the future. It offers a comprehensive review of the region's overall preparedness; the responses of fire, EMS and law enforcement; recovery operations; emergency management; and hazmat and environmental monitoring. It is available from www.usfa.dhs.gov.

     "The uniqueness of this bridge collapse, and the challenges faced by firefighters and their command staffs, offers an opportunity for firefighters across this nation to learn from the Minnesota response to this event," U.S. Fire Administrator Greg Cade said of the report.

     The collapse, on August 1, 2007, killed 13 and injured 121. Hennepin County Medical Center EMS led the EMS reponse.

Best Practices
     What went right? Lots of things, authors conclude.

• Cooperation among first responders and their metro, state and federal partners was judged to be outstanding. Local players had done ample joint training, including in NIMS, and were familiar with their colleagues, roles and procedures.
• Local EMS plans worked well, including the Metro EMS Incident Response Plan and use of mutual aid.
• Initial EMS response was rapid and of sufficient quantity. Multiple divisions were established, including operations on both sides of the river. EMS Dispatch also ramped up successfully.
• EMS successfully utilized the Incident Command System.
• A new 800 MHz radio system, implemented after a 2002 evaluation found the previous communications system lacking, worked as hoped and generally kept organizations linked.
• Technology—including on-site video cameras, Web-based GIS and traffic management, and municipal Wi-Fi—enhanced response and recovery efforts.

Lessons Learned
     There were, however, problems that arose. They fortunately did not lead to injuries to responders or diminished outcomes for patients. On the EMS front, the report cited:

• Some providers did not follow an early order to evacuate the bridge when fire engineers were concerned about further collapse. "Communities should ensure that all first-responder personnel are cognizant of warning and evacuation signals," the report concludes, "and understand the importance of adhering to such orders."
• The EMS Branch Director lacked staff support to enact full multicasualty operations.
• Multiple transportation groups were established, complicating the challenge of tracking transport units, patients and destinations.
• Many EMS personnel used cell phones—a method normally preferred by emergency physicians due to its convenience—to contact hospitals directly, rather than going through the Medical Resource Control Center, which officially coordinates transports and destinations. This led to a confused big-picture view of how many patients, and what type, were going where.
• Triage ribbons and tags were not universally used.
• No EMS official was at the Emergency Operations Center.

     Most of the concerns raised in the report, authors note, have been recognized and addressed by local authorities.

Physio-Control Clarifies Terms of Consent Decree
     Physio-Control has not been prohibited from making and shipping products under the terms of a federal consent decree, the company emphasized in a May statement from President Brian Webster.

     Seeking to dispel reports that it had been permanently enjoined from continuing business, Physio stressed that it was "clearly permitted to manufacture and ship a limited amount of product for emergency providers under certain conditions according to the consent decree."