Biological Terrorism Threat Greater Than Ever
According to members of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation & Terrorism, a WMD attack is likely to occur before the end of 2013.
Mohamed Atta had a great interest in crop dusters.
That aspect of the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks, noted at the time but less remembered now, is still on the minds of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation & Terrorism. It suggests an interest by terrorists in biological weapons, and America still has a long way to go to be ready for a biological attack.
That conclusion informs the Commission's new interim report, The Clock Is Ticking, and was emphasized by its leaders, former U.S. senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, who summarized the document at a special event held Oct. 21 at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. A biological attack, the senators stressed to assembled media and subject-matter experts, is more likely than a nuclear attack, and a WMD attack is likely to occur somewhere in the world before the end of 2013.
Congress established the Commission to address the threat of WMD proliferation to the United States. Its initial report, World at Risk, published in December 2008, made specific recommendations to improve American safety and preparedness, and The Clock Is Ticking reflects efforts to improve understanding of those findings and turn recommendations into actions. Consider it "a shot across the bow," said Graham.
The gist of the report: The U.S. government has taken some of the actions needed, but these actions have not kept pace with the increasing capabilities and agility of terrorists wanting to harm the U.S. and other nations. What's more, Graham said, the "lockdown" strategy employed to mitigate the threat of nuclear terrorism--identification and securing of nuclear material--isn't suitable to address the bio threat. Instead, the Commission urges directed efforts to reduce the consequences--to take the mass out of mass destruction.
The problem with biological weapons is that the material to create them occurs naturally, requires no great infrastructure to weaponize, and can be found in nearly every part of the world. Therefore, to deter attacks, the United States needs to demonstrate through preparedness and public exercises that it can blunt the impact. This means developing the capability to rapidly and inexpensively produce and distribute vaccines and therapeutics.
The H1N1 experience shows how difficult that can be. Half a year after the virus appeared, we still lack sufficient vaccine. If the threat is something more immediately deadly, that sluggishness could spell trouble. We must improve four key areas, Graham said: 1) Early detection; 2) ability to communicate with those responding, including EMS; 3) development of therapeutics for the exposed; and 4) ability to distribute them under emergent conditions.
That requires investment today. A major step, the senators emphasized, would be passage of a bill introduced by Sens. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Susan Collins (R-ME) intended to improve security at laboratories that handle dangerous pathogens. That bill, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009, would also provide medical kits for emergency responders to protect them while responding to WMD attacks, create a National Bioforensics Analysis Center, and expand the fledgling program by which the U.S. Postal Service distributes medications and supplies.
There is not yet comparable legislation in the House.
Find the Commission's interim and earlier reports at its website, www.preventwmd.gov. Its final report is expected in early 2010.












